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1. Introduction
Since the advent of political independence, many governments in Africa have looked to the
manufacturing sector as the main vehicle of structural transformation and reduction of dependence
on primary exports. However, it is now generally accepted that “misguided attempts to promote
industrialisation without regard to comparative advantage or stage of development have led to
inefficient use of resources in many countries” (World Bank, 1992:122). During the 1970s, almost
one-third of African countries had negative average annual rates of manufacturing output growth
and, in another quarter, these growth rates stagnated at below 2.5 percent.
 An important objective of the economic reform programmes that are currently being pursued
in almost all African countries is to eliminate the “inefficient use of resources” by industrial enterprises.
It is clear that the industrial sector in most African countries is being profoundly affected by this
process of reform which has accelerated markedly during the 1990s. However, there has been
remarkably little independent analysis of just how successful industrial restructuring in Africa has
been. Two reviews of structural adjustment programmes undertaken by the World Bank in 1992
and 1994 concluded that industrial restructuring had been successful in the majority of countries
under scrutiny and that this was particularly so among those countries that had most consistently
pursued comprehensive macroeconomic reforms (see World Bank, 1992a and 1994). But other
economists outside of the World Bank have been less sanguine and some have argued that “structural
adjustment programmes damage the prospects for industrialisation” (Stoneman, 1994:104) and
may, in fact, be leading to wholesale de-industrialisation.
The purpose of this paper is to review the industrial performance of African economies during
the 1990s and to then discuss the principal reasons why this performance, particularly with respect
to the manufacturing sector, continues to be so poor in the majority of countries. The discussion will
be structured as follows. Section 1 outlines the broad objectives of industrial restructuring as these
have been interpreted by the World Bank. Section 2 addresses the weaknesses of the main data
sources that are generally relied upon in assessing the industrial sector. Section 3 reviews the
performance of the industrial sector, looking specifically at the following indicators: output growth,
share of GDP, the sectoral composition of output, private and foreign investment, exports, and
employment and training. Section 4 then analyses the principal factors that have affected the
performance of the industrial sector, focusing in particular on investment, exports, and productivity.
Finally, in Section 5, the prospects for the industrial sector and the role of government policy are
briefly considered.2 Paul Bennell
2. The Objectives of Industrial Restructuring
Industrial restructuring has been and continues to be a key objective of most economic reform
or ‘adjustment’ programmes that have now been introduced in most African countries. The overall
objectives of industrial restructuring are to shift resources into industrial activities (i.e. conventionally
defined as mining and quarrying, manufacturing, and utilities) that have a clear comparative advantage
coupled with “the achievement of an overall size of the industrial sector that reflects a country’s
relative capacity for engaging in manufacturing via-a-vis other economic sectors” (World Bank,
1992b:127).  Achieving international competitiveness is therefore of paramount importance and
enterprises unable to reach the “best practice frontier” should be phased out.
The role of government is to take actions that address the root causes of the low social profitability
of industrial investments. In particular, barriers must be removed that prevent enterprises from taking
steps that increase their efficiency. There are three types of barriers: (i) Those that weaken enterprise
discipline by shielding enterprises from adjustment pressures. More specifically, a  variety of “policy
distortions” result in a lack of competition, “soft budgets” for state owned enterprises, and agency
problems (in particular poor government control over public enterprises) that allow managers of
industrial enterprises to operate at low levels of efficiency. Thus, competition policy is nearly always
a central feature of industrial restructuring strategies. (ii) Factor mobility. Productive inputs (labour
and where, possible, capital) must be able to reallocated within and between sectors. (iii) Resources.
The ability to carry out restructuring is predicated on the availability of key resources that, without
appropriate government interventions, will not be forthcoming. These include managerial and technical
skills, information, infrastructure, and finance.
During most of the 1980s, the World Bank and the IMF saw industrial restructuring in Africa
as being part and parcel of the overall process of macroeconomic stabilisation and changing the
incentive structure for the economy as a whole (in particular between the tradable and non-tradable
goods sectors). This was broadly in line with Bank thinking that comprehensive industrial restructuring
should only be embarked upon once macroeconomic stability had been achieved. Consequently,
the initial phase of industrial restructuring has concentrated on the removal of discipline barriers by
correcting “distorted incentive structures”. In particular, trade liberalisation (lower, more uniform
tariffs and removal of quantitative restrictions, most notably import licensing) coupled with substantial
real exchange rate devaluations seek to (i) reduce and ultimately eliminate high rates of effective
protection thereby creating a competitive market environment and increased efficiency; (ii) reduce
excessive dependence of manufacturing enterprises on intermediate and capital imports but, in the
short run, improve the availability of key imports in order to achieve rapid increases in production
through higher capacity utilisation; and (iii) encourage exports of manufactures.
Industry specific policies have also been concerned to remove other market distortions (such
as price controls, investment licensing and other barriers to entry, restrictive labour practices, and
reform of public enterprises including privatisation and excessive export incentives) as well as correct
market failures that could undermine the required supply response in the medium-long term.  Removal
of policy biases against micro and small enterprises has also been an overarching objective of industrial
restructuring in Africa. In particular, trade liberalisation, privatisation and better access to finance
and technical assistance, by creating “a more level playing field”, are intended to encourage the
rapid development of these type of enterprises which are generally owned and managed by
“indigenous” entrepreneurs. This, it is argued, will create a more balanced manufacturing sector
which is better integrated with other key sectors (especially agriculture), and well placed to respond
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It should be stressed that the specific objectives of industrial restructuring programmes have
varied considerably depending on the particular set of problems confronting the industrial sector in
each country.  Among those group of countries that had been effectively de-industrialising during the
1970s (such as Ghana, Tanzania, Uganda and Congo (DRC)), the main short term objective has
been to achieve rapid increases in production capacity utilisation in more efficient, priority industries.
In other countries, however, industrial restructuring has focused more on attempts to boost private
investment in the medium-long term either by using a ‘carrots and sticks’ approach with an already
well established private sector (as in Kenya and Zimbabwe) or the wholesale dismantlement of
dominant public sector enterprises (as in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia).
3. Data Limitations
The general availability and quality of statistical information on industrial output and other key
performance indicators is extremely poor in most African countries. National accounts statistics are
notoriously unreliable. For example, a recent World Bank study in Zambia found that the national
account figures overestimated manufacturing output by at least 50 percent (see World Bank, 1996a).
Surveys of industrial production are generally more reliable, but are regularly undertaken in fewer
than fifteen countries. Serious criticisms have also been made about the usefulness of these surveys.
In Zambia, “the average error in the index was often as large or larger than average year to year
changes in the index. Thus, in most cases it was not possible to sat with degree of confidence that a
change in the index from one year to another really meant that production had altered (Kmietowicw,
1989:25). Manufacturing associations in many African countries are equally sceptical about the
accuracy of official production and income statistics. For example, the Manufacturers Association
of Nigeria (MAN) informed its members that “the softness of and conflicting statistics emanating
from official sources render a view of the performance of the economy difficult if not impossible”
(MAN, 1995:1).
Similarly, most analyses of foreign investment flows to Africa use IMF data which is extracted
from recipient country balance of payments accounts. However, a close examination of the FDI
data entries for most African countries reveals that the three main components of FDI (direct
investment, reinvestment, and loans) are not consistently reported over time. Therefore, it is not
even possible to analyses accurately trends within a single country, let alone for the continent as a
whole.
At best, official statistics can be used to identify broad trends in output, export and investment
levels. More detailed analysis has to be based on more limited surveys of specific manufacturing
industries and types of enterprise in individual countries. During the 1990s, the World Bank sponsored
Regional Program on Enterprise Development (RPED) has been by far the largest research activity
and has focused specifically on the response of manufacturing enterprises to adjustment policies.
The core of the RPED has been periodic, in-depth surveys of around 900 enterprises in four sectors
(food, garments, wood and metal goods) in four countries (Cameroon, Ghana, Kenya, and
Zimbabwe). Given the scope and quality of these survey data, the following discussion will draw
heavily on the RPED research findings.4 Paul Bennell
4. Performance Indicators
Output Growth
In overall terms, the growth performances of both the mining and manufacturing sectors in
Africa have been disappointing during the 1990s. Table 1 shows that the annual average growth in
industrial output (measured in constant prices) between 1990 and 1995 was negative in over 40
percent of the 46 countries for which data are available (see also annex table 1).  Annual growth
rates were low (i.e. less than 2.5 percent) in another 14 countries. Only six countries (Mali, Comoros,
Lesotho, Mauritius, Tanzania, and Uganda) registered high growth rates averaging over 5 percent
per annum. Indices of the volume of industrial production over this period are also available for a
limited number of countries. These also reveal a similar pattern of highly variable but generally poor
growth (see annex table 2).
The growth performance of the mining sector in the key African countries is presented in Table
2. Mining is widely regarded as a key growth sector in Africa. However, with the exception of
Ghana, Mali, and Zimbabwe, output growth in most countries has been low or negative, at least up
until 1995. Trends in the volume of production in the largest mining sectors reveal a similar picture.
The rapid growth in gold production in Ghana is clearly a success story, but output levels for copper
have plummeted in Congo (DRC) and Zambia (see annex table 3).
The performance of the manufacturing sector has also been especially weak, with nearly half of
all countries recording negative real growth rates between 1990 and 1995 (see table 3). This picture
is even worse if countries such as Angola, Liberia, Mozambique, Sierra Leone, Somalia, and Congo
(DRC) which have no output data but where manufacturing industries have been seriously affected
by war and civil strife are also included. Furthermore, these aggregate figures tend to disguise the
extent to which many manufacturing enterprises in Africa have been fighting for survival during the
1990s. In Ghana, for example, which has had moderately good manufacturing growth rates during
the 1990s, “large swathes of the manufacturing sector have been devastated by import competition”
(Lall, 1993: 134). In Malawi, which according to World Bank data enjoyed 4.0 percent growth in
manufacturing output in 1996, “the manufacturing sector is having a desperately difficult time. Output
fell 5.6 percent in 1996 as firms suffered from competition from cheap imports and struggled to
cope with the high interest rates government has used to pull inflation down” (EIU, 1997). In Nigeria,
the manufacturing sector in 1992 was reported to be “on the verge of collapse with returns to
manufacturing activity being “dismally low” in relation to other sectors (Thompson, 1992:35). In
Cameroon, a survey conducted in mid-1996 found that 80 percent of industrial enterprises had
been unable to increase output levels over the previous year because of numerous obstacles, including
primary material supply (99 percent of respondents), deterioration of equipment (86 percent), financing
(82 percent) and transport problems (77 percent) (see EIU, 1997). In Kenya, “the last few years
have been traumatic. The manufacturing sector has suffered from macroeconomic instability and
uncertainty and a deterioration in the business environment”  (Bigsten et al , 1995:14 ).
The World Bank’s high profile 1994 publication Adjustment in Africa concluded that the
industrial and manufacturing sectors in most countries had been “expanding” between 1986 and
1991 as economic liberalisation programmes were implemented. Clearly, however, this positive
conclusion does not hold for the 1990s. Not only have industrial and manufacturing growth rates
been absolutely low, but they are appreciably lower than during the 1980s. Only four countries
(Lesotho, Mozambique, Tanzania, and Uganda) had average annual industrial growth rates in the
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In two-thirds of countries where this comparison can be made, the difference in industrial growth
rates is negative. The corresponding percentage for manufacturing growth rates is 70 percent. Only
in one country, Uganda, was the difference in manufacturing growth rates between these two periods
greater than five percent.
However, on a more positive note, industrial and manufacturing growth rates were higher
during 1995 and 1996 than for the 1990-95 period as a whole in  80 percent and 77 percent
respectively of African countries (see annex tables 1 and 2). This improvement was particularly
noticeable among the franc zone countries which suggests that the major devaluation of the CFA
franc in January 1994 has provided some stimulus, at least in the short term, to industrial enterprises
in most of these countries. In other countries (most notably Angola, Ethiopia, Mozambique, and
Rwanda), industrial performance improved fairly quickly once wars and other civil strife ended or
significantly abated while in others (most notably Gambia, Central African Republic, Liberia, Sierra
Leone) growth rates fell as a result of the disruption caused by these kind of shocks.
Figures 1 and 2 show the scatter plots between rates of growth of industrial and manufacturing
output, on the one hand, and national output, on the other between 1990 and 1995. Three countries
(Rwanda, Sierra Leone, Sudan) which have been seriously affected by civil  war  and which therefore
have extreme outlier values have been excluded from the analysis. With an R- squared value of
0.35, the relationship between industrial and GDP growth is relatively weak. In part, this is a
Table 1: Growth of the industrial sector in Africa, 1990-1995
Negative growth Zero growth Positive growth





West & Central Africa
Cameroon CAR Cape Verde Burkina Faso Benin Mali
Chad Niger Nigeria Congo Gabon





East & Southern Africa
Burundi Zimbabwe Ethiopia Angola Namibia Comoros
Rwanda Mozambique Botswana Swaziland Lesotho
Seychelles Kenya Mauritius
South Africa Madagascar Tanzania
Sudan Malawi Uganda
Zambia
Notes: High positive/negative growth = +/- >5%,
Moderate growth = +/- 2.5 - 4.99%,
Low growth = +/- 0.1 - 2.4%.
Source: World Bank (1997) African Development Indicators.6 Paul Bennell
consequence of the enclave nature of the mining sector which accounts for a large proportion of
industrial output in Africa (see below). The relationship between manufacturing and GDP growth is,
however, much stronger (with an R-squared value of 0.61) mainly because growth in manufacturing
output is heavily dependent on increases in overall domestic demand. It is also clear that positive
GDP growth is closely associated with positive growth in manufacturing output in the majority of
countries (i.e. those in quadrant 2).  Among the small minority of (five) countries which have had
positive GDP growth but negative rates of manufacturing growth (quadrant 1), it is interesting to
note that annual GDP growth for all of them remained very low i.e. less than two percent per annum.
The Relative Importance of Industrial Production
The share of industrial and manufacturing in national output is a key indicator of the extent of
structural transformation of an economy (see Chenery, Syrquin and Robinson, 1985). On the basis
of international comparisons over relatively long periods of time, it is clear that during the early
stages of the development process there exists a close and positive relationship between the shares
of the industrial and manufacturing sectors in national income as real per capita income increases. In
low income countries, therefore, where these shares have fallen appreciably, de-industrialisation
may well be occurring.
Over the fifteen year period 1980-1995, the share of industrial output in GDP declined in 20
out of the 36 countries for which data are available (see table 4). In 12 countries, this decline has
been sizeable i.e. more than five percentage points. With respect to the manufacturing sector, however,
in only 8 out of 29 countries did the share of manufacturing output decline and only in one country
(Rwanda) was this decline more than five percentage points.
Figures 3 and 4 plot the relationship between industrial and manufacturing output growth and
the changes in the shares of these sectors in national output between 1990 and 1995. It can be
observed that with respect to both sectors there are quite a few countries where these shares have
fallen but average annual GDP growth has been positive (quadrant 1). Should this situation persist,
then de-industrialisation is clearly taking place. Of even greater concern, however, are countries
Table 2: Growth of the mining sector in selected African countries, 1990-1995
Negative growth Zero growth Positive growth
High Moderate Low Low Moderate High
West & Central Africa
Benin CAR Guinea Congo Ghana
Cameroon Senegal Gabon Mali
Congo (DRC) Chad Mauritania
East & Southern Africa
Rwanda South Africa Botswana Lesotho Ethiopia
Zambia Gabon Namibia Mauritius
Kenya Zimbabwe Uganda
Madagascar
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located in quadrant 4 where both shares and GDP have fallen and quadrant 3 where shares have
increased, but in the context of overall economic decline. The future challenge is for all countries to
locate themselves in quadrant 2  with high GDP growth rates and increasing shares of industrial and
manufacturing output (assuming, of course, that production in the latter sectors is efficient).
Sectoral Composition of Output
Manufacturing output accounted for less than one quarter of industrial output in slightly more than
one-third of African economies in 1996. This is mainly because of the key role of mining (including
oil) in these countries. In fewer than 20 percent of economies does the contribution of manufacturing
exceed three-quarters of total industrial output. During the 1990s, in nearly half of the countries for
which data are available, the share of the manufacturing sector has remained largely unchanged, but
has fallen appreciably (i.e. by more than two percentage points) in 36 percent of economies while
increasing in only 14 percent. For the continent as a whole, therefore, it appears that there has
occurred some shift in industrial production away from manufacturing  towards mining and the utility
sectors (see figure 5).
Within the manufacturing sector, lack of data and considerable variations between countries
make it difficult to draw many firm conclusions about changes in the performance of the main
manufacturing industries. However, with a few exceptions, textiles and clothing industries everywhere
have contracted significantly mainly because trade liberalisation has resulted in a wave of cheaper
imports of new and second hand clothing. There is lot of fragmentary evidence concerning the
decline of the textiles sector right across Africa. Even in Uganda which has enjoyed high rates of
manufacturing growth in most sectors, the real value of textiles and clothing declined by 8 percent
Table 3: Growth of the Manufacturing Sector in Africa, 1990-1995
Negative growth Zero growth Positive growth
High Moderate Low Low Moderate High
North Africa
Algeria Egypt Morocco Tunisia
West & Central Africa
Chad CAR Cameroon Niger Burkina Faso Mali Benin





East & Southern Africa
Angola Ethiopia Botswana Comoros Lesotho
Burundi Malawi Kenya Tanzania Mauritius
Rwanda South Africa Madagascar Swaziland Namibia
Zimbabwe Zambia Sudan Uganda
Source: See Table 1.Industrial Restructuring in Africa During the 1990s: Outcomes and Prospects 9
between 1992 and 1995 (Uganda, 1996). Zimbabwe has one of the largest and most efficient
textile sectors in Africa, but during 1994 alone, the volume of production fell 65.1 percent (Zimbabwe,
1995). In Kenya, textiles and clothing production fell 27 percent and 17 percent respectively in
1995 (Kenya, 1996). In Nigeria, which had an import ban on clothing for much of the period 1985-
95, the Manufacturers Association of Nigeria reported in 1994 that “the textile industry is an emaciated
mirror image of its former self” with “an influx of foreign fabrics dumped as well as smuggled into the
country” (MAN, 1995:3). In Malawi, production at the Lonrho subsidiary, David Whitehead Ltd.
plummeted from 20 million metres in 1989 to 3 million metres in 1994 (Lonrho, 1995). Much of the
textile industry in Tanzania is state-owned and has been put into receivership.
Table 4: Change in the Shares of Industrial and Manufacturing Output, 1980-1995
(percentage points of GDP)





West & Central Africa
CAR Gambia Benin Ghana Burkina F.
Congo Togo Cameroon Guinea Bissau Chad




East & Southern Africa
Mozambique Ethiopia Botswana Burundi
Namibia Kenya Zimbabwe Lesotho
Rwanda Madagascar Malawi














East & Southern Africa
Rwanda Ethiopia Botswana Burundi Lesotho
Kenya Namibia Malawi
Tanzania South Africa Mauritius
Uganda Zambia
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Other sectors have also been very badly affected by intensified import competition, particularly
vehicle assembly, white goods, and electronics which are generally low value added and heavily
reliant on imported parts and other raw materials (see annex tables 5 and 6). In Nigeria, for example,
production levels of vehicles and radios and televisions in 1995 were reported to be 11.7 percent
and 6.0 percent of 1985 levels. The poor performance of the machinery and other metal goods
industries (even in countries such as Zimbabwe) is particularly worrying because of the central role
these sectors (which rely heavily on core engineering skills) typically play in successful industrial
development. The shoe industry and, in some counties such as Kenya, the sugar industry have also
been badly affected by imports. In some countries, (e.g. Congo, Niger, Chad), manufactured imports
are largely smuggled and distributed via the informal sector.
Industries that have tended to fare better are those such as food, beverages, tobacco, wood,
and cement which rely mainly on locally produced inputs. In some countries, the shift in production
towards agro-processing has been quite dramatic. In Zambia, for example, the food, beverage and
tobacco industries increased their share of total manufacturing output from 39.3 percent in 1990 to
54.9 percent in 1994 (see World Bank, 1996).  In addition, products with high transportation costs
have been able to maintain a high degree of natural protection. This is especially the case for landlocked
countries that have lengthy and often poor transport links with sea ports. However, even these
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Figure 5: Share of Manufacturing in Total Industrial Output in SSA Economies, 1990 and
1996
contend with much increased levels of import competition For example, the 1995 Annual report of
Kenya Breweries Ltd noted that “liberalisation and the stabilisation of the shilling brought in their
wake increased competition in the beer market from imported canned beers and a reduction in the
profitability of the export trade” (Kenya Breweries Ltd, 1995:4).   Serious “cost-cutting measures”
had to be introduced in order to respond to this new challenge. Cement producers in many countries
have also had to contend with increasingly competitive imports.
Type of Enterprise
As noted earlier, a key objective of industrial restructuring in Africa is to promote the development
of the micro, small and medium sized enterprises by removing the constraints and distortions of high12 Paul Bennell
protection import-substitution industrial policy regimes that strongly favoured large scale enterprises
and by generally providing a more enabling environment. By creating a level playing field, the overall
intention is to plug the ‘missing middle’ that characterises the industrial sector in most African
economies. One would expect, therefore, smaller enterprises to respond more positively to economic
reform than larger enterprises. However, prior to adjustment, shortages of foreign exchange in many
countries meant that large scale enterprises, most of which were heavily dependent on imported
spare parts and raw materials, operated at extremely low levels of capacity utilisation. Despite the
strong policy biases that affected micro and small enterprises, many flourished since they were far
less reliant on imported inputs and could respond positively to local demand that was largely unmet
by larger enterprises. Thus, with the advent of economic reforms and, in particular, the marked
improvement in the availability of foreign exchange,  some economists have anticipated that the large
enterprise sector would regain their market dominance.
The available evidence on the impact of economic reform and industrial restructuring on the
MSME sector is patchy and, at times, contradictory. The RPED surveys suggest, however, that
among the sampled firms, average employment levels have increased fastest among the microenterprise
group (1-9 employees), but have decreased among the large group (100+ employees). The extent
of microenterprise expansion has been particularly impressive in Ghana where over 40 percent of
the enterprises are reported to have graduated to the 10-49 employee size cohort between 1998
and 1992. In Cameroon, Kenya, and Zimbabwe, however, this percentage was much smaller - 14
percent, 12 percent and 4 percent respectively- over a similar time period. But among small and
medium enterprises in the four RPED countries, employment growth has been much less impressive.
In particular, in Cameroon and Ghana, 45 percent and 57 percent respectively of medium scale
enterprises (i.e. 50-99 employees) dropped into the small enterprise size category during a five-six
year period. In all four countries, the incidence of microenterprises graduating into the large enterprise
category remained minimal, although quite sizeable proportions of medium-sized enterprises in Kenya
and Zimbabwe (27 percent in both countries) grew to become large enterprises during this period.
Elsewhere, there is more impressionistic evidence that indicates that competition is intensifying
between micro and small enterprises, on the one hand, and large enterprises, on the other. In Gabon,
for example, “there  is intense competition from the expanding informal sector which produces
cheap, albeit low quality, goods and distributes smuggled goods in major urban areas” (EIU, 1997:34).
Overall Employment and Training Levels
Only very fragmentary time series data are available for the 1990s on total employment in the
industrial and manufacturing sectors. However, for the majority of countries and, in particular, among
those that have most rigorously followed economic reform programmes, total manufacturing
employment has generally declined. For example, in Cameroon, Mauritius and Zimbabwe, the number
of manufacturing employees declined by 14.0 percent, 6.0 percent and 5.6 percent respectively
between 1990 and 1995. Ghana has probably experienced the greatest contraction in manufacturing
employment - from 53,600 in 1986 to just 20,600 in 1991 (see, ILO, 1996).
Faced with greater import competition, most firms have been forced to rationalise and streamline
their operations. State-owned enterprises (SOEs) that have been privatised have also tended to
shed surplus labour both during the run-up to privatisation and when enterprises have been actually
divested. In Zambia, for example, among a sample of SOEs that were privatised in 1994 and 1995,
median post-privatisation employment was 30.3 percent lower than in 1992 (see Bennell, 1997a).
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on the overall level of formal training conducted by enterprises. This is particularly the case for
formally indentured artisan apprentices. In Tanzania, for example, in 1990, the national training
agency responsible for artisan training managed to place 66.7 percent of trainees with employers for
the prescribed three years of structured on the job training . By 1995, this had fallen to 10.3 percent
(see Bennell and Mukyanuzi, 1997). In Zimbabwe, the total number of newly indentured apprentices
fell from 1,223 in 1991 to 994 in 1995 (see Bennell, Kanyenze and Munetsi, 1997).
Investment
Insufficient investment is the most important proximate cause for the poor output performance of the
industrial sector in the majority of African economies during the 1990s. With the increasingly rapid
privatisation of state-owned industrial enterprises (in particular in countries such as Ghana,
Mozambique and Zambia where the public sector has dominated industrial production), it is clear
that private sector investment will largely determine the rate of growth of industrial production in all
countries in the future.
Disaggregated data on private sector investment in the mining and manufacturing sectors are
not available in most African countries. However, it can be observed in Table 5 that total gross
private sector investment expressed as percentage of GDP has not only remained generally very
low since the mid 1980s when the majority of countries embarked on economic reform but, more
serious still, this percentage fell in 15 out of the 26 countries for which data are available between
1989/90 and 1993/94. It is the case that rates of private investment have increased in slightly more
countries since the mid 1980s (14 out of 24 for which data are available), but with the exception of
a few countries such as Mozambique, Tanzania and Zimbabwe, these increases have been very
small.  Among the RPED survey countries, pooled data for the four countries indicates that between
1991 and 1995 the annual gross investment rate was only 6 percent of the value of the capital stock
and only 11 percent of value added, suggesting that net investment was negative (see  Collier and
Gunning, 1997).
Foreign Direct Investment
The mining and manufacturing sectors account for the bulk of foreign direct investment in Africa.
During the period 1983-88,  at the height of the economic crisis in most African countries, average
annual net OECD investment in sub-Saharan Africa was a mere US$ 323 million. Elsewhere in the
world, FDI was growing at an unprecedented rate so that, for example, British investment in sub-
Saharan Africa was a minuscule 0.5 percent of total UK foreign investment in the late 1980s (see
Bennell, 1989). Although net investment by OECD countries has increased considerably since then
(averaging US$1.3 billion between 1990  and 1995), two-thirds of this increase was concentrated
in just three oil-exporting countries (Congo, Gabon and Nigeria) and three OECD countries (the
United Kingdom, France and Japan) accounted for 80 percent of the increased investment. And,
while net investment was higher in 24 countries, it fell in another 21 countries (see annex table 8).
Detailed breakdowns are not available, but a very significant proportion of ‘new ‘ foreign investment
is in fact re-investment by existing subsidiaries and associate companies, rather than inflows of
equity and other capital from new investors. Furthermore, while net investment as a whole has
increased since the mid-1980s, there has nevertheless been widespread disinvestment, particularly
in manufacturing industries (see Box 1).14 Paul Bennell
Exports
With a few exceptions (Egypt, Lesotho, Mauritius, Morocco, South Africa, Tunisia), the level of
manufactured exports from African economies remains minuscule. Table 6 shows that, while there
has been limited growth in manufactured exports in some countries, there has been a general failure
to exploit the new opportunities afforded by significant real exchange rate devaluations and improved
access to foreign exchange and other inputs during the 1990s.  A 1996 survey of manufacturing
enterprises in Mozambique, Tanzania, and Zambia found that, if anything, trade liberalisation had
adversely affected the capacity of firms which were already exporting. The survey highlighted the
“fragility of the majority of firms exporting wholly or in part for export. Many are operating at the
very limits of profitability and viability, even of survival. Traditional exporting firms are either moving
out of export production, with others literally ceasing production or going out of business” (UNIDO,
1996:54).
The evidence from the four RPED survey countries also reveals a limited export response of
the manufacturing sector. The overall export orientation of the survey firms in Ghana, Kenya and
Zimbabwe increased by less than two percentage points of total output between 1991 and 1995. In
Cameroon however, there was a sizeable increase in export orientation (from 27.9 percent in 1991
to 40.8 percent in 1995) which was mainly accounted by the much improved competitiveness of
textile and wood products following the historic CFA devaluation of December 1994. In all four
countries, however, most of the increase in manufactured exports was accounted for by enterprises
that were already exporting during the late 1980s. In particular, large, capital intensive and technically
efficient foreign firms tend to have a much greater export orientation than other firms. Bigsten et al
argue that expansion within firms already exporting is unlikely to generate an export boom and that,
therefore, an extensive entry of new exporters is essential (see Bigsten, 1997). However, given that
there appears to be a definite size threshold in order for firms to enter successfully most manufactured
export markets, a trade-off may exist between the objectives of rapid industrialisation and the
development of “indigenous entrepreneurship” which is likely to be mainly concentrated among
small and medium enterprises.
5. Growth Constraints
The New Received Wisdom
While it is still widely accepted that “getting prices right” is an essential prerequisite for efficient and
sustainable industrial growth, with the generally poor performance of the industrial sector in most
African countries during the 1990s, much more emphasis is now being attached to those aspects of
the industrial restructuring process that focus on the removal of critical ‘resource’ constraints. The
World Bank’s recognition of the overriding importance of more deep-seated ‘structural’ factors
has, however, been quite recent. As late as 1994, the Bank’s ‘Adjustment in Africa’ Report confidently
stated that, in general, industry had responded very positively to new economic incentives, and that
this has been particularly the case where adjustment programmes had been comprehensively
implemented and sustained.  Now, however, Bank staff readily concede that “the supply response
of the manufacturing sector, especially manufacturing exports, has been uniformly inelastic in almost
all SSA economies” (Biggs and Raturi, 1997:2). Given the World Bank’s influential role in all aspects
of policy formulation in Africa, particularly among heavily aid-dependent low income countries and
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Table 5: Gross Private Investment as Percentage of GDP, 1980-1994
Difference
Country 1985-86a 1980-90a 1993-94a 1989-90 and 1993-94
Benin 6.2 8.3 9.8 1.5
Burkina Faso 14.7 13.3 14.0 0.7
Burundi 2.7 2.3 2.2 -0.1
Cameroon 15.2 12.4 12.9 0.5
Cape Verde 10.6 15.0 12.0a -3.0
Comoros 5.5 6.6 8.5 1.9
Côte d’Ivoire 5.3 4.2 7.7 3.5
Gabon 31.8 25.9 18.6 -7.3
Gambia 8.4 14.9 13.5 -1.4
Guinea 8.9 8.5 8.3 -0.2
Kenya 11.1 11.1 10.0 -1.1
Madagascar 3.1 5.3 4.9 -0.4
Malawi 4.0 8.7 2.2 -6.5
Mali - 11.9 13.1 1.2
Mauritania 20.5 13.3 15.5 2.2
Mozambique 10.2 21.3 37.8 16.5
Namibia 5.7 10.6 11.2 0.6
Nigeria 5.4 8.3 4.2 -4.1
Senegal 7.8 8.9 10.5 -1.6
Sierra Leone 6.5 9.9 4.6 -5.3
South Africa 12.4 13.1 11.2 -1.9
Sudan 8.3 8.3 - -
Swaziland 7.8 14.4 11.9 -2.5
Tanzania 12.9 20.3 19.7 -0.6
Togo 13.4 17.4 7.0 -10.4
Uganda - - 8.8 -
Zambia 4.9 2.4 5.7 3.3
Zimbabwe 7.5 14.7 17.9 3.2
Notes:  African Development Indicators, 1996.
Source:  a Simple averages of growth rates for each two year period.
In  trying to understand the determinants of the inelastic supply response, most empirical research
now focuses on identifying key microeconomic constraints that affect the capacity of various types
of industrial enterprises to expand production efficiently. Certainly, there are those in the research
community who still continue to argue that inadequate incentives (that are largely the outcome of
basic shortcomings of macroeconomic policy and other fundamental distortions created by excessive
government interventions) are still the main culprits (see, for example, Teal, 1995). However, a new
received wisdom is emerging that accepts that a more interventionist, long term industrial strategy
that specifically targets particular problem areas is urgently needed.
Private Sector Development
The overall success of economic reform in Africa hinges on the ability of private economic agents to
respond to the new  opportunities that become available.  This is particularly the case for those
countries that have pursued socialist or quasi-socialist development strategies since the attainment
of political independence. The fundamental weakness of the private sector in most African economies,
is therefore the superordinate constraint that must be surmounted if market-led capitalist development
is to succeed. It is precisely for this reason that ‘private sector development’ has become of such16 Paul Bennell
central importance in the World Bank’s country lending programmes and general policy discourse
throughout Africa. With respect to the industrial sector, the previously disabling policy environment
that discouraged entrepreneurship needs to replaced with a new enabling environment that aggressively
promotes a new industrial class of ‘indigenous’ entrepreneurs. At the same time, however, it is clear
that much greater involvement of non-indigenous, foreign enterprises and individuals is also needed
in order to attract additional investment, and access new technologies, skills and markets. Getting
the policy balance between these two groups of economic agents is a major challenge in nearly all
countries.
The absence of strong rural and industrial capitalist classes capable of sustaining a process of
rapid capital accumulation across a range of high growth sectors and able to ensure that the state
plays the necessary enabling roles has been the central weakness of the development process in
Africa. Clearly, therefore, explanations for the failure of these types of classes and developmental
states to emerge must be based on an in-depth analysis of the complex interplay of economic,
social, cultural, and political factors that have shaped both policy and practice during the last five
decades. However, because economists continue to dominate academic and policy debates on the
reasons for the poor performance of the industrial sector in Africa, most analysis tends to narrowly
economic and usually focuses on the very recent past. In so doing, there is a failure to recognise that
many allegedly economic constraints are themselves the outcome of social and cultural factors (see
While the overall level of net foreign investment in sub-Saharan Africa has not declined appreciably
during the 1990s, the number of industrial enterprises with foreign equity participation may well
have declined. The limited evidence that is available comes from foreign investment surveys in
Germany, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Specifically, 388 US affiliate companies
were reported as operating in SSA in 1985. By 1993 (the last year for which data are available), this
had fallen by 30 percent to 270 companies. During the same period, total employment fell from
85,000 to 49,500. The number of affiliates increased in only three countries (Congo, Gabon, and
Malawi). The number of German affiliates also declined from 170 in 1991 to 124 in 1994, with
employment falling from 28,000 to 21,000.
A detailed survey of UK manufacturing investment in English-speaking Africa found that in
1989, 90 British companies had a total of 336 equity involvements, but by 1994, there were only 65
companies with equity stakes in 233 manufacturing enterprises. A small group of 20 parent
companies accounted for nearly 70 percent of these equity stakes. The combined share of the two
giants, Lonrho and Unilever, was 22.4 percent. An earlier survey in 1989 had also reported that
approximately one-third of UK companies that had manufacturing equity involvements during the
late 1970s had already disinvested during the 1980s. It is clear therefore that the disinvestment that
has occurred during the 1990s represents a continuation, albeit accelerated, of an already well
established process of corporate withdrawal. Some of the most important disinvesting companies
include: Chloride and Lucas (batteries), Leyland Trucks (vehicle assembly), Courtaulds (paper,
packaging and paints), Boots and Wellcome (pharmaceuticals), ICI (chemicals) Low and Bonar
(textiles, plastics, engineering), Pilkington (glass), Raleigh (bicycles), and Lonrho (paper, printing
and packaging, food and drink). Probably the largest and, in many ways, the most symbolic
disinvestment was the sale in 1994 of most of Unilever’s 40 percent stake in the United Africa
Company in Nigeria. UK disinvestments were spread across all manufacturing industries, although
the metal goods, electrical goods and transport equipment were particularly badly affected.
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Moore, 1997). In other words, just as the focus on “getting prices right” has proven to be overly
simplistic, there is a danger that the diagnosis and proposed policy solutions to the multiple supply
constraints affecting industrial enterprises in Africa may fail to get to grips with more deep-seated
problems that are preventing the emergence of a strong and dynamic class of  entrepreneurs in each
African country.
The Investment Climate
As discussed earlier, low and declining private investment ratios in most African economies have
been consistently identified as being of critical importance in explaining the poor supply response of
the industrial sector. Numerous enterprise surveys have been undertaken in order to identify the
main obstacles that affect firm output expansion which turn will eventually lead to new investment.
Table 7 summarises the severity and rank of these obstacles in seven RPED countries. Lack of
credit and lack of demand consistently emerge as the two most important constraints in all countries.
During the period 1990-95, average annual rates of GDP growth were stagnant (i.e. less than 1
percent) or negative in well over half African economies, and were over 4 percent in barely one-
quarter. These aggregate growth rates conceal the extent to which the purchasing power of the large
majority of the population has fallen since the mid-1980s. The World Bank reports that the number
Table 6:  Manufactured Exports from African Countries, 1985-1995
1985 1995 (1987 constant dollars)
North Africa
Algeria 26 32 -25.7
Egypt 446 922 6.2
Morocco 474 1,591 0.9
Tunisia 877 4,574 7.3
West & Central Africa
Cameroon 126 127 6.0
Chad 5 1 -
Côte d’Ivoire 728 900 -
Gambia - - -7.2
Nigeria - - -8.0
Senegal - - 12.1
Togo 47 60* 21.9
East & Southern Africa
Angola 22 39 -
Burundi 6 7 1.6
Kenya 117 184 -7.6
Lesotho 2 43 -
Mauritius 212 807 5.7
Madagascar 37 75 5.0
Namibia 95 289 -
Rwanda 0 0 -5.8
South Africa
Tanzania 33 79 -12.5
Tanzania 252 1,891 6.5
Notes: Omitted countries have negligible manufactured exports.
Sources: Amounts 1985 and 1995: World Bank, Trends in Developing Economies, 1996.
Rates of growth: World Bank, unpublished data.18 Paul Bennell
of African families unable to meet their basic needs doubled between 1985 and 1995 as average
incomes fell by one third (World Bank, 1997:1). This erosion of purchasing power is also frequently
commented upon in the annual reports of major companies, especially those producing basic wage
goods. In Nigeria, for example, Unilever’s 1994 Annual Report notes that “the operating environment
will be difficult and challenging until the end of the decade” (Unilever, 1994:6) Falling consumer
demand coupled with an inadequate supply of foreign exchange resulted in capacity utilisation of
only 37 percent in 1993. The lack of depth of most financial systems in Africa has also seriously
dampened investment. While nominal interest rates are generally very high, in most countries they
have remained low or negative in real terms which has restricted the availability of financial resources.
High public sector deficits in many countries have also continued to crowd out private investment.
The next most serious constraints reported by the RPED survey firms are lack of public services
(including infrastructure) and high taxes and utility prices. Interestingly, import competition and a
range of government regulations (most notably foreign exchange, price controls, licences, and labour
regulations) are not widely rated as being serious obstacles. This is probably because many enterprises
continue to enjoy fairly high absolute levels of protection, but economic liberalisation has largely
eliminated many of the more onerous government controls that previously characterised import
substitution regimes in Africa. Without serious competition, the economic pressures on enterprises
to invest heavily in new productivity-enhancing plant and equipment is likely to remain limited.
The investment climate in most of Africa is seriously affected by exceptionally high levels of
risk and uncertainty. Investments are particularly irreversible in Africa because of a number of factors,
including the lack of second-hand markets for machinery and other equipment and, given the absence
of developed equity markets in most countries, the difficulty of selling firms as on-going concerns
Enterprises are also frequently heavily reliant on a few suppliers (see Collier and Gunning, 1997).
The unreliability of audited accounts and the difficulty of enforcing legal title significantly increase
risks. More recently, considerable attention has focused on the lack of ‘social capital’ in African
business communities which are often characterised by low levels of trust, both between enterprises
themselves, and between enterprises and the public institutions that are responsible for the regulation
and promotion of industrial activity. In particular, difficulties in enforcing contracts can result in high
levels of opportunism thereby significantly increasing transaction costs. In such high risk business
environments, financial institutions typically demand exorbitantly high levels of collateral before being
prepared to make loans.  The success of some industrial communities such as Nnewi in Eastern
Nigeria has been due in  large part to their ability to reduce risk and uncertainty and develop close
trust-based relations (see Box 2).
More generally, the process of economic reform has itself frequently exacerbated already very
high levels of risk and uncertainty. In particular, exchange rates have become more volatile and
increased competition and higher input costs have lowered profitability which continues to be the
single most important determinant of investment. Relatively low returns to manufacturing investment
are widely reported in Africa which, in turn, discourages investment in the sector. For example, the
1993 and 1994 surveys by the Paris-based Centre pour les Investissements en Afrique Noir (CIAN)
of French owned firms operating in the Franc Zone reported that only 29 percent and 10 percent of
firms were ‘clearly profitable’ (CIAN, 1993 and 1994). In Ghana, profit rates in 1993 varied from
just 0.2 percent for large firms to  8.2 percent for micro and small enterprises. The much lower
profitability of large firms was largely because wage rates were, on average, four times higher than
those paid by small firms. This rise in wages with size, “acts as a tax on the profits of firms as they
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The threat of major policy reversals as economic reform programmes are implemented is
widely regarded as another key factor that has markedly increased investment risk.   This is especially
the case where government commitment to economic reform  is perceived as being low with key
reforms being implemented under duress mainly because of donor pressure and conditionality. Where
therefore the reform process lacks credibility and is not ‘locked-in’, investors will be understandably
reluctant to make sizeable and largely irreversible long term investments.
Foreign Investment
Many of the same factors that have dampened domestic investment also explain the relatively limited
increase in foreign investment in the industrial sector in recent years. During the last decade, African
governments have made increasingly concerted attempts to improve the investment climate for
transnational corporations and other foreign investors. In particular, new investment codes have
been promulgated that have swept aside many of the restrictions  and impediments that have limited
foreign investment in the past, replacing them with a variety of investment incentives and guarantees.
These include the freedom to remit profits, the removal of limits on the level of foreign equity, and the
granting of work permits  for expatriate personnel.
While these changes in investment policies mark a decisive break with the past and are absolutely
essential in order to attract new foreign investors, they are merely bringing African economies into
line with investment policy regimes elsewhere in the developing world. As all research on the
determinants of direct foreign investment has conclusively shown, corporate investment decisions
are mainly the outcome of an assessment of key economic and political ‘fundamentals’ (see, for
example, Guisinger, 1985). The investment policy regime is therefore a necessary but not sufficient
condition for increased investment flows. The key economic fundamentals for most investors are the
current size of the markets they wish to produce for, the growth prospects of these markets,
production costs, and the extent of domestic and foreign competition. Potential investors also assess
the progress made to date in achieving lasting economic reform along with the future growth prospects
for the economy as a whole and, in particular, they look very carefully at what local investors are
doing.
As discussed earlier, there has been some increase in net FDI flows to sub-Saharan Africa
during the 1990s. These increases have also been accompanied by an overall improvement in
profitability. For example, the overall rate of return on US investments increased form a very low
level of 1.9 percent in 1989 to approximately 8 percent in 1995. This compares very favourably
with rates of return in other developing regions. Similarly, excluding Nigeria, net income from British
investments in SSA rose by 60 percent during the same period. Despite these improvements,
widespread concerns still persist about the credibility of economic reforms which continue to be
fuelled in many countries by the large gaps that exist between stated policy and actual practice.  In
a 1994 survey of 150 foreign enterprises operating in East Africa, the most serious reported deterrent
affecting foreign investment was ‘political and policy uncertainty’. In addition, five of the next six
deterrents were of a policy type, including poor infrastructure and excessive government regulation.
Although there has been a slight increase in the overall creditworthiness of countries in sub-Saharan
African since 1992, in absolute terms the continent remains over two times less creditworthy than
the other major country recipients of private capital flows (see Bhattacharya, Montiel and Sharma,
1997).
Without doubt, the high incidence of civil wars and other major political crises has seriously
discouraged FDI, not only in the 15-20 countries that have been directly affected, but also in the
continent as a whole. The dismantling of one-party states and the ending of long military dictatorships20 Paul Bennell
Table 7: Severity Index (and Bank) of Obstacles to Firm Expansion in RPED countries
(Number of firms which claim these obstacles to be among their three most - Ranks are in parentheses)
Obstacles Burundi Cameroon Ghana Kenya Tanzania Zambia Zimbabwe
1993 1993 1992 1993 1993* 1993 1993
Lack of credit 3.3(1) 4.0(1) 3.8(1) 3.4(1) 133(1) 3.5(1) 3.1(1)
Lack of 3.0(2) 3.7(2) 2.6(2) 2.7(2) 37(6) 2.8(3) 2.9(2)
demand
High taxes 2.7(3) 3.0(3) 1.9(4) 1.4(8) 21(8) 1.8(7) 2.3(7)
Lack of support 2.7(3) 2.5(5) 1.6(7) 2.0(4) 57(4) 2.4(6) 2.4(6)
  services
Lack of 2.2(6) 2.4(8) 1.8(6) 2.1(3) 58(3) 2.8(3) 2.8(3)
  infrastructure
Lack of - - - - 3(15) - -
  security
High utility 1.6(9) 2.5(7) 2.2(3) 1.7(6) 59(2) 2.8(3) 2.8(3)
  prices
Lack of skilled 2.4(5) - - - 14(9) - -
  labour
Import 1.5(10 2.5(6)* 1.8(5) 1.9(5) 40(5) 2.6(5) 1.9(10)
  competition
Local 2.0(7) - - - 29(7) - -
  competition
Corruption - - - - 6(13) - -
Regulation 1.7(8) - - - 13(10 - -
  uncertainty
Investment 2.6(4) 1.1(9) 1.1(13) 2(18) 1.4(8 2.0(9)
  benefits
Activity 1.2(12) 1.7(11) 1.1(10 1.3(10) 3(15) 1.1(13) 1.4(13)
  restrictions
Labour 1.2(12) 1.7(10) 1.1(10) 1.0(14) 3(15) 1.2(12) 1.8(11)
  regulation
Location 1.2(12) 1.1(15) 1.3(8) 1.4(9) - 1.2(11) 1.4(14)
  restrictions
Ownership 1.1(17) 1.2(14) 1.1(13) 1.0(15) 9(11) 1.1(13) 1.5(12)
  restrictions
Licences 1.2(12) 1.9(9) 1.1(13) 1.5(7) 4(14) 1.3(10) 2.0(8)
Price controls 1.3(11) 1.3(13) 1.0(15) 1.3(11) 1(19) - 1.1(15)
Foreign
  exchange 1.2(12) 1.3(12) 1.1(12) 1.2(12) 8(12) 1.3(9) 2.7(4)
Note:  Severity index is rated from 0 (low) to 5 (high).
Source:  World Bank, 1996b.
has been universally welcomed. However, greater democratisation has not significantly reduced
political instability and uncertainty in many countries. Finally, the low and, in many countries, declining
level of domestic private investment is a powerful signal to potential investors about the overall
dynamism of the private sector and the likely growth prospects for the economy as a whole. For all
these reasons, most potential foreign investors have adopted a ‘wait and see’ attitude.
The International Investment Corporation, the private investment arm of the World Bank, has
become the single largest source of foreign equity and loan capital in sub-Saharan Africa. The
composition of the IFC’s annual investment portfolios is a good indicator of the relative attractiveness
of investments across the main economic sectors. During the 1990s, manufacturing investments
have accounted for only around 10 percent of total investments while mining and oil comprised 50Industrial Restructuring in Africa During the 1990s: Outcomes and Prospects 21
percent. This breakdown is symptomatic of the difficulties faced in identifying attractive opportunities
for foreign investment in manufacturing industries in most of Africa.
Privatisation
In many countries, particularly those where state-owned enterprises have dominated the industrial
sector generally poor industrial growth has invariably been closely connected with the slow pace of
the privatisation process. State-owned enterprises have continued to perform badly in many countries,
with governments being obliged to subsidise heavily their activities. This has been further aggravated
by the prospect of divestiture itself. In Mozambique, for example, “in an effort to demonstrate
commitment to the privatisation program, the government announces early on the process which
companies are to be privatised. Once the announcement is made, it is difficult for enterprises in
question to do business, Credit dries up.. and foreign customers are reluctant to enter in to contractual
arrangements with such firms” (World Bank, 1995:69). As a result, “operations are rendered virtually
impossible” (ibid.).
At least up until 1993-94, most governments lacked the strong political commitment necessary
to implement major privatisation programmes. Opposition to the sale of SOEs has come mainly
from strong vested interests, most notably senior managers and workers in SOEs themselves.
Politicians and populations at large have also been concerned that indigenous entrepreneurs actively
participate in privatisation programmes and are not squeezed out by local non-indigenous nationals
(mainly Asians and Lebanese) as well as foreign capital. In Zimbabwe and South Africa, the prospect
of local white business communities being the principal beneficiaries of privatisation has been one of
the main hurdles preventing these countries from seriously embarking on privatisation.
With regard to more strictly economic issues, the saleability of public enterprises has been the
single most serious obstacle in most privatisation programmes.  Governments have generally tried to
maximise revenues from privatisation sales by relying on asset-based valuations whereas potential
buyers use mainly business-based valuations that calculate the net worth of an enterprise by estimating
likely net profit streams and offsetting these against current liabilities. Using the latter valuation
methodology, many SOEs have negative net worth (especially those with large debts), and thus
governments must be prepared to virtually give them away if they are to be divested successfully.
Not surprisingly, many governments have been reluctant to do this.
Information on the post-privatisation performance of enterprises remains sparse but there have
been some notable success stories (see Box 3). However, the sale of public enterprises to indigenous
business interests has been frequently problematic. More specifically, the limited financial capacity
of African entrepreneurs to purchase SOEs is indicated by the large number of “unconsummated
transactions” in a number of countries, most notably Ghana, Guinea, and Nigeria and, to a slightly
lesser extent, Burkina Faso and Uganda. In Ghana, for example, 12 enterprises collectively valued
at over 20 percent of the 1990-94 tranche of privatisations had to be ‘re-divested’ because of the
non-payment of mainly deferred sales agreements. Between 1990 and 1994, gross sales of SOE
equity amounted to C63.1 billion, of which only 34 percent had been paid by the end of May 1994.
Similarly, in Nigeria, N2.3 billion out of total privatisation sales of N5.7 billion had were overdue in
1993 (see Bennell, 1997).22 Paul Bennell
Nnewi is a ‘rural town’ located 15 miles Southwest of Onitsha in the eastern region of Nigeria. During the
early 1980s, when total manufacturing output was falling rapidly in Nigeria, an industrial boom was
underway in Nnewi. In the space of just two years, 1983-84, 23 large to medium sized factories and
engineering shops were started by Nnewi businessmen. Half of these new enterprise produced motor
parts with the remainder producing a very wide range of products including electrical wire and cables,
switchgears and electrical fittings, bottled liquor, plastic electrical accessories, toilet paper, and road
construction equipment.
In trying to understand the Nnewi phenomenon, Deborah Brautigam argues that this dynamic,
geographically tight cluster of indigenous capitalist manufacturers have “largely substituted for the state
i.e. they have successfully filled the gaps left by the failures of both the market and the state. In particular,
through embeddedness - personal relations and culturally-grounded institutions that act as sophisticated
networks, reduce information uncertainties and agency problems and enhance trust - they have reduced
the high transaction costs typically faced by African entrepreneurs seeking to enter industry (Brautigam,
1997:1065).
The state in Nigeria has largely failed to create an enabling environment for the development of an
efficient and dynamic manufacturing sector. “The wide swings in macroeconomic parameters, the
unreliable electricity supple, the frustrations of the telecommunications system, and the remarkable
levels official corruption” (ibid:1070) have had a devastating impact on industrial development. It is true
that during the early stages of Nigeria’s short lived economic reform programme that lasted from 1986 to
1992, manufacturing enterprises did respond very positively to improved incentives and better availability
of inputs. What is particularly interesting, however, is that not only does the start of the industrial boom in
Nnewi predate this reform episode, but production has been sustained well into the 1990s when most
of the manufacturing sector in Nigeria has been crippled by foreign exchange shortages, rapidly
deteriorating infrastructure, and depressed domestic demand.
Eastern Nigeria is the home of the Igbos. There are well recognised characteristics of Igbo culture
(most notably individualism, competitiveness, and receptivity to change) that fuel  entrepreneurialism
and capitalism in the region. Igbos invest heavily in education and training and have rules of inheritance
that encourage capital accumulation. However, in addition to these undeniably important cultural features
of Igbo society, there are specific institutional factors that have played a central role in facilitating industrial
development in Nnewi. Throughout Nigeria, entrepreneurs have to contend with a very high risk business
environment. Transactions costs are so high in part because “the state has not provided the kinds of
public goods that would reduce them”. Apart from poor infrastructure, property rights are poorly specified
and often difficult to enforce, and there are a battery of regulations that have to be dealt which is costly,
both in terms of time and bribes. More generally, poor market information significantly raises transaction
costs.
What is special about the Nnewi business community is that both formal and informal institutions i.e.
rules and regulations and patterns of behaviour have evolved that lower transactions costs in a variety of
ways. Most industrialists in Nnewi were originally traders.
Many ran shops selling motor spare parts. At least half started their working lives as apprentices to
successful motor traders. These traders have developed “tightly controlled but decentralised lineage-
based distribution networks that ensured that relatives were in charge of the central parts of the business
groups” (ibid:1074). In making the transition, therefore, to manufacturing production, not only have Nnewi
traders had a strong base of relevant knowledge and skills, but they have continued to rely on a very
supportive network of relationships that are cemented together by high levels of trust and cooperation.
There are numerous cultural practices that lower transaction costs in Nnewi. For example, trading
networks have engendered a form of cooperative competition which has been transferred to manufacturing.
In particular, sharing of equipment and lending of skilled personnel is common. Close trust-based
relationships also ensure that key information travels quickly among both producers and traders.
Furthermore, Nnewi entrepreneurs have over a number of years developed close links with motor spare
part producers and wholesalers in Taiwan and other Asian countries. These links proved especially
valuable when Nnewi traders began to develop their own production activities and obtained detailed
advice and other technical assistance from their Asian suppliers about the type of machinery and other
technologies they should acquire and the acquisition of the specific skills needed to operate efficiently.
Source:  D. Brautigam, 1997.
Box 2:  Nnewi: ‘The Taiwan Of Africa’Industrial Restructuring in Africa During the 1990s: Outcomes and Prospects 23
Productivity
Very low and, in some countries, declining levels of factor productivity is the fundamental problem
that has undermined the ability of industrial enterprises in Africa to withstand heightened import
competition and break into export markets. Reliable data on the level and trends in factor productivity
among industrial enterprises in Africa is very limited. However, among the four RPED countries,
labour productivity fell between 1992 and 1996 (See Collier and Gunning, 1997). In Ghana, for
example, value added per employee (measured in constant cedi prices) fell by 60.1 percent in the
machinery sub-sector between 1991 and 1993, 38.9 percent in furniture, 12.7 percent for bakery
products, and 4.8 percent for wood. Only garments and food enterprises recorded overall increases
(of 6.6 percent and 0.7 percent respectively) in labour productivity during this period Thus, “far
from policies leading to rises in productivity and a move to efficiency at international prices, the
opposite is happening, firm costs are rising: in part due to the failure to raise productivity through
investment” (Teal, 1995:7).
The low task efficiency of workers in Africa seriously undermines the attempts of enterprises
to become internationally competitive. Table 8 shows, for example, that the number of garments
produced per machine operator per eight hour shift in Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe is considerably
lower than in India and China. However, average wage costs in Africa are low enough to offset the
productivity disadvantage which has enabled garment producers to penetrate export markets. But,
as long as productivity levels in Africa lag behind Asia, the only way that African producers can
remain internationally competitive is for the exchange rate to decline steadily and for wage costs to
be kept very low. Thus, as Biggs and Raturi point out “the real cost of lagging productivity is the low
standard of living that it brings” (Biggs and Raturi, 1997:5).
The low technological capabilities of entrepreneurs, managers and workers has been consistently
identified as the root cause of the poor productivity of manufacturing enterprises in Africa.
Understanding the reasons for these poor capabilities and how they can be improved is a major
objective of the RPED studies. In Ghana, for example, Lall et al conclude that “the manufacturing
sector at large has only been able to develop a rather limited range of capabilities in a few mature
simple technologies. There is little sign of dynamism in any of the main forms of technological
development. It is not in a position to launch a broad based export thrust unless new technological
capabilities are introduced by new foreign investors, or created by investments in local skills and
technical effort” (Lall et al, 1992:114). The study found that (i) entrepreneurial success was clearly
associated with higher levels of education and, for this reason, most informal sector enterprises lack
an adequate educational base to develop technological capabilities.  Thus, they “are destined to die
out as modern industry emerges” (ibid:127); (ii) the use of formal technical skills is generally very
low; and (iii) the affiliates of foreign firms have the best systems for training managers and workers
both on and off the job.  Similarly, in Kenya, lack of technological capabilities resulted in most
enterprises adopting a ‘defensive’ rather than an ‘offensive’ approach in response to increased
levels of import competition.  In particular, owners and senior managers tended to reduce costs by
cutting employment, moving into non-tradables, and simply doing nothing as opposed to countering
the threat posed by import competition by buying new technology, intensifying staff training, and
attempting to export (see Lall and Wignaraja, 1996).
Biggs and Raturi use a simple econometric model to analyses the impact of different sources of
learning on firm productivity in three RPED countries, namely Ghana, Kenya and Zimbabwe. Four
learning-related variables are tested- level of internal and external training by the firm, the extent of
technology transfer, the level of foreign ownership, and whether or not the firm exports. Their findings24 Paul Bennell
provide striking evidence of the importance of technological capabilities. With the exception of the
export variable, the other learning variables are positive and statistically significant. In particular,
worker training has a very large impact on productivity, such that “if these countries doubled the
mean number of workers trained by firms from the current average of 9 percent to 18 percent, this
itself would increase the average productivity of firms by 6 percent” (Biggs and Raturi, 1997:29).
Not only is the overall incidence and quality of firms’ internal technical learning efforts much lower
than in Asia and Latin America, but, equally important, learning from external sources is “extremely
weak or missing altogether in the three African countries...most firms are technologically isolated
from the rest of the world” (ibid:34).  In most African countries, the small number of enterprises that
typically exist in specific product sectors undermines the development of very sizeable learning
externalities that generally characterise well established ‘clusters’ of enterprises producing the same
or similar products.
Weak indigenous technological capabilities coupled with generally negative government and
popular attitudes towards the employment of expatriate managers and technical personnel has also
meant that most African countries have generally been unsuccessful in acquiring foreign skills and
technologies. In the context of de-colonisation, especially where the nationalist struggle was protracted
and/or highly adversarial, this unwillingness to learn from foreigners is not perhaps not surprising, but
it is in marked contrast to the experience of the newly industrialising countries in Asia where enterprises
consciously and aggressively utilised all possible sources of skills and knowledge from overseas
sources. According to Amsden, “the formal education of the workforce and the apprenticeship of
the firm to foreign technical assistants (rather than the apprenticeship of workers in particular trades)
lie at the heart of the late industrial experience (in East Asia)” (Amsden, 1989,:215). Thus, the
willingness and capacity to become a successful learner are both critically important ingredients for
the attainment of international competitiveness.
6. Future Prospects and the Role of the State
The development prospects for the mining industry in Africa are extremely good. Exploration activity
has grown enormously since the early 1990s which should lead to a boom in mining production over
the next 3-5 years. New mining developments will be overwhelmingly foreign owned and managed,
with South African companies playing an increasingly important role. Investment policy regimes for
the mining sector have been or are being comprehensively reformed in most countries and are
broadly in line with policy regimes elsewhere in the world.    With regard to manufacturing, however,
the future is much less certain. But what is clear is that, given the fundamental lack of competitiveness
of large sections of manufacturing sector in most African countries, there is a real possibility that
many enterprises, both large and small, will be unable to cope with increasing import competition
resulting from comprehensive trade liberalisation.
Whatever happens, the manufacturing sector will be almost entirely private sector driven. Thus,
its future development will largely depend on the overall process of private sector development in
each country. There are three key components to private sector development, namely the restructuring
of the state so that key supportive functions can be fulfilled, the emergence of an indigenous class of
industrial entrepreneurs with the necessary skills and attitudes, and the divestiture of all or most
state-owned enterprises. While the pace of public sector reform has generally been very sluggish,
there has been a marked acceleration in recent years. This is particularly the case with regard to the
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in over 20 countries. Consequently, at the end of 1997, only a small minority of countries had not
embarked on fully fledged privatisation programmes and, within five years, it is likely that most state
owned enterprise will be in private hands. In those countries where the state has dominated the
industrial sector, it is clear that the whole process of private sector development is inextricably tied
up with the outcome of the privatisation process, and in particular, the ability and commitment of the
new owners to improve productive performance.
There are two key sets of private sector actors, namely local and foreign enterprises and
entrepreneurs. While there is widespread agreement that much increased levels of foreign
manufacturing investment are crucial, there is little real likelihood of this happening in most countries,
at least in the short term. Nevertheless, it is still important that close links are established with foreign
companies that enable key skills and technologies to be accessed (see below).  Both local and
foreign enterprises will continue to be adversely affected by the multiple constraints on manufacturing
output and productivity that have been discussed earlier. Unless the most serious of these constraints
can be effectively resolved in the short-medium term, the prospects for the manufacturing sector will
remain poor. There is broad agreement, therefore, that governments in Africa should: (i) consistently
pursue wide-ranging macroeconomic reforms and take whatever steps that are necessary to ensure
that these reforms are seen as credible and locked-in. This includes the removal of excessive
government regulation that leads to serious price distortions. Eliminating these distortions is vital in
order to create the right incentive structure for manufacturing enterprises. (ii) Reform financial systems
and develop capital markets so that firms are able to access adequate long term finance at reasonable
costs; (iii) Improve telecommunications, transport and other basic infrastructural services; and (iv)
Generally strengthen the overall institutional framework essential for the efficient functioning of product
and factor markets. This includes improvements in  judicial, accounting and auditing systems in
order to endure secure property rights and improve contract compliance.
The Morogoro Shoe Company in Tanzania was sold to an Asian company in 1992. The new owners
revamped production machinery and equipment. As a result of these improvements, production
increased from 200 to 2000 shoes a day from mid-1992 to the end of 1995. Capacity utilisation
increased from 5 percent to 38 percent during the same period. Employment increased from 42
before divestiture to 240 in 1995.
INDOL, a subsidiary of South African Breweries, acquired a 50 percent shareholding in Tanzania
Breweries Ltd in December 1993, at a cost of US$22.5 million. This was subsequently increased to
60 percent in 1994. The new managers sourced US$63 million additional capital that was used to
modernise beer production at the existing brewery in Dar Es Salaam as well build a new brewery in
Mwanza. Sales volumes more than doubled in the three years following privatisation. After-tax
profits increased from T.Sh. -0.6 billion in 1993 to T.Sh. 15.4 billion in 1996, but employment
decreased from 2554 to 1800 during the same period. In mid-1996, the Company declared and paid
dividends to the government of nearly T.Sh. 2 billion- the first time dividends had been paid since
the mid 1970s.
Sources: United Republic of Tanzania, Parastatal Reform Commission, 1995/96 Review and the Action Plan for 1996/
97, Dar Es Salaam, July 1996 and Seminar on Privatisation for Honourable Members of Parliament, Dodoma April 1996.
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Where there is much less agreement is the role that should be played by the state in directly
supporting the industrial sector. Economic growth is generally picking across Africa and this will
feed through into increased domestic demand for manufactured goods. However, it is clear that the
manufacturing sector in Africa will remain tiny unless there is a dramatic increase in manufactured
exports. Some argue that the problems of African manufacturing are so serious that it will simply not
be possible for enterprises to become internationally competitive. A related contention is that states
in Africa fundamentally lack the capacity to implement the kind of interventionist manufacturing
export strategies successfully undertaken in the high performing Asian economies. Consequently,
only a fairly limited number of manufacturing activities, the majority of which entail processing of
local resources, will have a comparative advantage and thus be economically viable.  This pessimism
is compounded by the changes that are occurring in the international trading system as a result of the
Uruguay Round of reforms. In particular, exporting to Europe, which has been the destination of the
bulk of manufactured exports from Africa, will become increasingly difficult as the trade preferences
given to African producers under GSP are progressively eroded and other non-trade barriers are
eliminated.  In the past, textiles and clothing have been seem as a key area for export production
from Africa. However, the ending of the Multi-Fibre Agreement in 2005 will give Asian textile
manufacturers unfettered access to European markets (see Stevens and Kennan, 1994).
There is, however, a more optimistic school of thought that argues that considerable scope
exists to improve manufacturing productivity in Africa and reach or at least get close to the best
practice frontier. But, this requires a coherent long term industrial development strategy that is a
combination of policies that not only improve the incentives for enterprises to become more efficient,
but also assist them to build up their technical capabilities so that they can respond positively to the
new incentives. Thus, the key component of such an industrial strategy is a comprehensive technology
policy that, above all, encourages the kind of private and collective learning mechanisms that have
enabled the Nnewi industrial cluster in Nigeria to thrive in such adverse circumstances. While it
would be entirely inappropriate to reinstate the levels of protection and thus high implicit subsidy for
manufacturing that prevailed during the era of import substitution, those industries that clearly have
the potential to improve productivity significant should be given the opportunity to do so. This will
probably require a certain amount of infant industry protection for a strictly limited period of time.
Given the limited capacity of the state to provide good quality support services, it is important
that any reforms are carefully targeted and state efforts are focused on supporting the efforts of
industry-wide organisations as a well as other private sector organisations. In particular, industry
training boards should be established that are largely controlled by employers and thus demand
driven. Training activities should normally be funded by a training levy. For larger enterprises, levy




operator in 8 hour shift Zimbabwe Kenya Ghana India EPZ China
Men’s casual shirts 12-14 12-15 12 16 18-22
Men’s jeans 10-12 n.a. n.a. n.a. 14
Index of unit labour cost 0.034 0.026 0.022 0.027 0.040
(for men’s casual shirts)
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funds could be used to fund both internal and external training activities. Training and other kinds of
technical assistance from foreign organisations and individuals both in-country and overseas is
particularly crucial. It is well known that small enterprises generally lack the capacity to train their
own staff and for this reason special steps will have to be taken to develop specialist training and
consultancy organisations that can cater to their needs.
Improving the overall quality of primary and secondary education is another key priority that
will ensure that all workers can attain higher levels of productivity and be highly trainable. However,
given the current preoccupation with ‘basic education’ especially in the donor community, there is a
danger that not enough attention will be given to improving the scope and quality of both general and
specialised training and other support services for industrial as well as other formal sector enterprises.
Furthermore, with up to 30 percent of the economically active population in some countries (especially
in East, Central and Southern Africa) expected to become infected with the HIV virus, human
resources development strategies must be able to tackle effectively the emergence of very serious
skill shortages. Whatever steps are taken, it is likely that the need for experienced expatriates will
increase very considerably in the short term in order to make up for shortfalls in the availability of
local personnel.28 Paul Bennell
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